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INTRODUCTION
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only.1
Sexual harassment remains a pervasive and insidious form of gender
discrimination in the American workplace more than forty years after Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly prohibited sex-based
discrimination in the employment context.2 Today, sexual harassment
claimants continue to suffer unjust economic consequences in addition to
debilitating physical, mental, and emotional harms.3 However, sexual
harassment perpetrators increasingly include not only coworkers and
supervisors, but also clients, independent contractors, patients, and other
third parties occupying ancillary positions in relation to an employee’s
1. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 (Lewis White
Beck trans., Bobbs-Merril 1969) (1785).
2. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Sexual Harassment
Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (illustrating
that individuals filed 13,136 sexual harassment charges with the EEOC in fiscal year 2004,
resulting in monetary damages of $37.1 million). See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (proscribing employers from discriminating in the workplace
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin).
3. See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1464-65 (1986) (arguing that sexual harassment
hinders women’s economic opportunities and leads to grave physical and psychological
ailments such as insomnia, nervousness, strokes, and emotional breakdown).
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primary workplace.4
The rise in third-party sexual harassment lawsuits can be traced to the
astronomical growth in the economy’s service sector and an increase in the
number of employers outsourcing their basic services.5 Thus, in attempting
to further develop a cogent body of sexual harassment case law, courts
increasingly face unique causes of action from claimants seeking relief
against employers for third-party sexual harassment.6 Predictably, both
state and federal courts are sharply split on the availability and scope of
remedies available to claimants.7
This Comment argues that state courts should apply the cumulative
remedy theory to employees’ third-party sexual harassment claims against
employers, permitting remedies under state common law regimes for
injuries that workers’ compensation laws should not exclusively cover.
Part I of this Comment discusses the development of federal court sexual
harassment case law under Title VII and the emergence of third-party
sexual harassment claims in state courts. It also examines the intersection
between state workers’ compensation laws, which traditionally serve as the
exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, sexual harassment suits, state
common law torts, and contracts causes of actions. Part II argues that state
courts should reject the exclusivity doctrine, which limits redress for most
workplace injuries to recovery under state workers’ compensation laws,
where employees’ third-party sexual harassment suits against employers
fall outside the purview of those compensation laws. Finally, Part III
analyzes the applicable common law torts and contracts causes of action
and argues that state courts should apply the common law causes of action
4. See, e.g., Associated Press, Nurses Face Sexual Harassment from Patients, CBS
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/15/ap/health/mainD8EG
UJI82.shtml (reporting that sexual harassment among patients toward nurses has become a
widespread problem that creates workplace tension and forces nurses to walk a fine line
between meeting their professional responsibilities and protecting themselves from sexually
aggressive patients).
5. See David S. Warner, Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An
Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 361, 363-64 (1995) (noting an
increase in third-party sexual harassment cases, and finding that some commentators expect
further victimization in the sales and services sector, where employees must strive to please
customers and accept mistreatment as a part of their work routines).
6. See Jeannie Scalfani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooter’s
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 165-66
(1997) (“This latter type of liability in sexual harassment law, employers’ culpability for
third-party transgressions, has neither been extensively litigated nor frequently written about
in academic literature.”).
7. See Little v. Windermere Relocation Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2001),
amended 301 F.3d 958 (2002) (“[W]here the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the
harassment by not taking immediate and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have
known of the conduct.” (quoting Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enter., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th
Cir. 1997))). But see Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 804 (N.J. 1990)
(ruling that the claimant cannot recover for third-party sexual harassment because he did not
show that the relationship was “coercive in nature”).
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and their remedies in conjunction with workers’ compensation laws to
ensure employees an apt recovery.
BACKGROUND
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE LAW IN
FEDERAL COURTS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the federal statute that is the foundation
for sexual harassment case law, began as racial equality legislation in
1964.8 Conservative congressmen added sex discrimination as a lastminute floor amendment intended to derail the bill.9 Commentators note
that the surreptitious nature of Title VII’s addition to the Civil Rights Act
makes it difficult to ascertain the intended scope of Title VII’s prohibition
against sex-based discrimination.10 Therefore, Title VII’s contours have
been largely defined by the judiciary with the limited guidance of executive
agencies.11
Federal courts first identified sexual harassment with Title VII’s ban on
sex-based discrimination in 1976.12 However, the federal judiciary did not
fully embrace this approach until the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) issued guidelines in 1980 articulating that sexual
harassment was a form of sex-based discrimination barred by Title VII.13
Subsequently, sexual harassment jurisprudence evolved in the form of case
law interpreting and applying Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition and
the EEOC guidelines’ explicit tying of sex-based discrimination to sexual

8. See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
9. See, e.g., Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Comment, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive:
Aligning the Standards in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 80
IND. L.J. 1119, 1134 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Ruth C. Vance, Workers’ Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: A Remedy for Employees, or a Shield for Employers?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 141, 147 (1993).
11. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14-25
(1994) (“[N]one of the originalist schools (intentionalism, purposivism, textualism) is able
to generate a theory of what the process or coalition ‘would want’ over time, after
circumstances have happened.”).
12. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing
that a male supervisor’s retaliatory actions in response to a female employee’s rejection of
his sexual advances amounted to sex discrimination under Title VII).
13. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ruling that the
claimant established a Title VII sex discrimination claim under the EEOC guidelines by
asserting that her sexually hostile work conditions involving stereotyping insults and
demeaning sexual propositions resulted in a deleterious psychological and emotional work
environment); EEOC, EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§
1604.11 (a) – (f) (2005) (recognizing that unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other sexual verbal and physical conduct constituted sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII even if it did not adversely effect employees’ economic benefits).
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harassment.14
Moreover, since the Supreme Court’s landmark sexual harassment
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,15 the federal judiciary has
gradually expanded the traditional scope of Title VII’s sexual harassment
coverage to comport with modern workplace conditions.16 For instance,
federal courts have found that sexual harassment laws protect both females
and males,17 shield employees from same-sex sexual harassment,18 coworker sexual harassment,19 and third-party sexual harassment.20
Additionally, federal courts constructed two distinct sexual harassment
categories.21 The first category is known as “hostile work environment”
sexual harassment, where a court will hold an employer liable if the
employer knew or should have known of workplace sexual harassment and
the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it altered the employee’s
work conditions.22 The second category is referred to as “quid pro quo”
sexual harassment, which holds an employer liable for conditioning job
benefits on employees’ performance of sexual favors or subjugation to
sexual advances.23
14. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (holding that the
legislative history guiding Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination is nonexistent, but
determining that Title VII sought to strike at the full spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women in employment).
15. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (ruling that the plaintiff’s claims that her employer
fondled her in front of other employees and raped her during the course of her employment
constituted sexual harassment actionable under Title VII).
16. See 76 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 331, at §§ 1.0-7.0 (2007).
17. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998)
(explaining that Title VII allows male plaintiffs to bring sexual harassment actions against
male defendants), Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911-13 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding
that Title VII applied in a case where a male supervisor fondled an employee and gave her a
negative performance rating after she refused his sexual overtures because the female
employee’s gender specific characteristics triggered the sexual harassment).
18. See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996)
(holding that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination does not consider sexual orientation and
that the determinative question is whether sexual harassment would have occurred “but for”
the claimant’s gender).
19. See, e.g., Star v. West, 237 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that when an
employer knows or should know of sexual harassment, it must take reasonably calculated
measures to halt the harassment in order to avoid Title VII liability).
20. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 879 F. Supp. 1047, 1052-53 (D. Nev.
1995) (holding that the claimant was entitled to $5.187 million in compensatory and
punitive damages because the employer had shown “conscious and deliberate disregard” by
permitting armed services members to engage in hostile sexual advances towards eighty-one
female employees).
21. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
22. See id. at 67-68 (reasoning that hostile work environment claims are actionable
under Title VII because Congress did not intend to restrict Title VII causes of action to
economic or tangible losses; instead Title VII was intended to eviscerate all forms of
disparate treatment between the sexes and address intangible injuries).
23. See Sexual Harassment Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (providing two
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II. EMERGENCE OF THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Third-party sexual harassment suits exclusively involve hostile work
environment claims.24 Aggrieved employees allege that their employer
should be liable for failing to reasonably detect and expediently terminate a
third party’s pervasive sexual misconduct that creates a hostile work
environment for members of the employees’ particular gender.25 Under
third-party sexual harassment, employers face the prospect of liability if a
court determines that an employer had control over the third party’s
harassing conduct.26 Hostile work environment claims are based on the
premise that sexually charged workplaces provoke sexually offensive
conduct that ultimately threatens an employee’s mental, emotional,
physical, and financial welfare.27
Commentators suggest that American society once considered sexually
charged work environments inoffensive and even routine in male
dominated workplaces.28 Today, courts recognize that third-party sexual
misconduct in an integrated workplace may disparately effect a particular
gender’s capacity to dispense with job duties, constituting a cognizable
Title VII sex discrimination claim.29 Consequently, third-party sexual
harassment cases present new challenges because an employer’s control
over third parties often varies from traditional hostile work environment
claims involving coworkers and supervisors, where an employer is deemed
theories of recovery for quid pro quo harassment: (i) if an individual’s employment is
explicitly or implicitly conditioned on his or her submission to an employer, supervisor, or
coworkers’ sexual advances, or (ii) if submission to or rejection of the employers’,
supervisor’s, or coworkers’ sexual advances is used as the basis of tangible employment
decisions adversely affecting the individual).
24. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 5, at 366-67 (observing that the judiciary has
consistently relied on the EEOC’s expansive view of Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination to encompass third-party sexual harassment under the hostile work
environment category).
25. See, e.g., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enter., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an employer can be liable for a third party’s sexual harassment where the
employer ratifies the behavior or acquiesces in sexual harassment by not taking appropriate
and timely remedial action when the employer knew or should have known of the thirdparty misconduct).
26. See FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 107 (1999)
(asserting that an employer is responsible for a third party’s sexual harassment of its
employees in the workplace when the employer or its agents knew or should have known of
the harassment, yet fail to take prompt corrective action).
27. See MICHELE ANTOINETTE PALUDI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION: A
HANDBOOK 156 (1999) (observing that hostile work environments are more difficult for
women to work in because offensive sexual behavior creates a demeaning and denigrating
atmosphere for female employees).
28. See, e.g., BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 86 (1992) (positing that sexually charged workplaces involving sexually
inappropriate joking and touching existed for years before legislators and courts recognized
such atmospheres as offensive and ultimately discriminatory towards a particular gender).
29. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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to control its agents’ actions.30 As a result, courts must ascertain the degree
of control an employer has over a third party when determining employer
liability for a third party’s harassing conduct.31 Regarding this control
analysis, the EEOC compliance manual and corresponding court decisions
mandate that employer liability for third-party sexual harassment depends
on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.32
III. IMPETUS FOR BRINGING SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS TO
STATE COURTS
Attorneys are more likely to litigate third-party sexual harassment claims
in state courts in an attempt to expand claimants’ causes of action through
state common law theories and to circumvent Title VII’s requirements on
employer size and award ceilings in federal litigation.33 Moreover,
although attorneys may pursue both punitive34 and compensatory35 awards
for sexual harassment claimants under Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of
1991, and state common law in state courts, they are less likely to face
limitations on the punitive to compensatory recovery ratio in state courts.36
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 219 (1977) (stating that a master is liable
for the torts his servant committed while acting in the scope of employment).
31. Sexual Harassment Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)-(e) (2007) (detailing that the
standard for finding an employer liable for third-party sexual harassment under Title VII
remains the same as that for coworker sexual harassment, but a court must also consider an
employer’s control and any other legal responsibility it has regarding the third party’s
conduct).
32. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 615.3 (1981) (articulating that the total facts
and circumstances of each case, include: (i) the employer’s knowledge of the harassment;
(ii) the employer’s control over the harasser’s conduct; (iii) corrective actions that the
employer took; and (iv) the employer’s other legal responsibilities regarding the harasser’s
conduct).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(b) (2006) (clarifying that an employer for purposes of the
Act must employ fifteen or more employees each working day in twenty or more calendar
weeks during a year); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(h) (limiting application of the Act solely to
“industries affecting commerce,” meaning businesses, activities, or industry obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)
(1991) (articulating that the amount of monetary damages awarded is a function of employer
size and establishing a maximum cap on recovery at $300,000).
34. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) (recognizing that punitive
damages are exemplary awards intended to deter similarly situated defendants from
similarly reprehensible actions, and they are awarded against defendants who commit
outrageous conduct with reckless indifference or wrongful purpose or intent).
35. See id. at § 903 (articulating that compensatory damages are designed to place a
claimant in “a substantially equivalent position” as if the harm never occurred and to
provide pecuniary relief for the injuries a claimant suffered or is likely to suffer).
36. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (refusing to
impose a bright line ratio of punitive to compensatory damages on state courts); see also
Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998
WIS. L. REV. 15, 37 (1998) (finding that the greatest increase in punitive awards has been in
business and contracts litigation, including deceptive behavior and wrongful termination in
sexual harassment cases). But see Phillip Morris, USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256, 5-8
(20007) (finding that although Oregon had a legitimate interest in imposing punitive

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol15/iss3/5

8

Shah: Supplementing State Workers' Compensation Laws With Causes of Act

2007]

THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUITS

585

In fact, the recent trend in Supreme Court decisions showing deference
toward state court affirmations of large punitive awards against
reprehensible defendants displays a trend toward judicial restraint so long
as large punitive awards satisfy the BMW of North America v. Gore37 test.38
Additionally, attorneys fear that federal judges may view third-party sexual
harassment claims as frivolous lawsuits that are likely to overburden
federal dockets.39 As an extension, many attorneys recognize that
claimants may be more likely to face judicial biases in federal courts as
opposed to state courts because politically appointed judges may favor
employer or industry interests over those of an employee.40
IV. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS, EMPLOYERS’ EXCLUSIVITY
DEFENSE, AND THE DUAL-CAPACITY DOCTRINE
All states have workers’ compensation legislation that serves as no-fault
systems intended to provide employees with quick and effective
administrative remedies for work-related injuries without assigning
potentially burdensome fault to employers.41 Specifically, workers’
compensation statutes seek to return employees to gainful employment by
providing payments for lost wages, medical expenses, and vocational
rehabilitation.42 The goal is to prevent workers from becoming a
damages to punish deceit by tobacco companies and deterring repetition of such
misconduct, a verdict resulting in a 100-1 punitive to compensatory ratio against defendant
constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because defendant
was punished for injuries inflicted on strangers to the litigation and deprived of an
opportunity to adequately defend against the charge and the “standardless” dimension of the
awards triggered fundamental due process concerns of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of
notice).
37. 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (stating that in determining the punitive to compensatory
damages ratio, the court should consider: (i) the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s
conduct, which is the most important factor; (ii) the difference between actual or potential
harm and the punitive award; (iii) and the difference between punitive damages awarded by
a jury and the civil penalty imposed in similar cases).
38. See Tony Mauro, Court Wades Into Fracas Over Punitives, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30,
2006, at 15 (on file with author) (observing that the “odd alliance” of Justices Ginsburg,
Scalia, and Thomas dissenting in State Farm v. Campbell, and the additions of conservative
Justices Roberts and Alito, may lead to an interpretation of State Farm rejecting bright line
limitations on punitive damages).
39. See generally Mark Hansen, The Next Litigation Frontier?, 79 A.B.A. J. 26 (Sept.
1993) (asserting that third-party sexual harassment claims will result in an onslaught of
excessive litigation).
40. See Adam Nagourney, Richard W. Stevenson, & Neil A. Lewis, Democrats See
Wide Bush Stamp on Court System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at A1 (reporting that sixty
percent of the 165 judges on the federal appeals courts are Republican appointees and nine
out of thirteen court of appeals have majorities of Republican appointed judges).
41. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 2144, 19th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (explaining that
courts should interpret Florida’s workers’ compensation laws as ensuring quick and efficient
delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured employees at a reasonable cost to
employers with the goal of restoring employees to working condition).
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.61 (2001).
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community burden by providing a transitional support system that supplies
statutorily calculated wage-loss benefits until the worker is capable of
resuming employment.43
Employers often use state no-fault workers’ compensation systems to
avoid common law liability by invoking the exclusivity doctrine, which
allows workers’ compensation statutes to categorically exclude all common
law causes of action for employees’ workplace sexual harassment-related
injuries.44 However, under the common law dual-capacity doctrine
employers lose this exclusivity defense.45 The dual-capacity doctrine
provides that when employers assume relationships with employees that are
discreet from that of an employer-employee relationship, thereby acting
outside the scope of an employment relationship or assuming a distinct
legal persona, the employer assumes secondary legal obligations in relation
to the injured employee.46 As a result, the dual-capacity doctrine allows
employees to impute common law liability to employers in derivative
liability jurisdictions, where an employer’s liability is ordinarily grounded
in public policy and is secondary or derivative from the primary wrongs of
the individuals the employer controls.47 In other words, application of the
dual-capacity doctrine does not turn on how separate or different the
employer’s second function is from its original function as an employer.48
Instead, it depends on whether an employer’s second function generates
legal obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the employer’s
original function.49

43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-57(a) (2000).
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (1975).
45. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222-23 (2nd pocket ed. 2001) (stating that an
employer, normally protected from tort liability by workers’ compensation laws, is liable in
tort to an employee if the employer and employee stand in a secondary relationship,
conferring independent obligations on the employer).
46. See, e.g., Hart v. Nat’l Mortgage & Land Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (holding an employer liable in tort when a supervisor grabbed the claimant’s genitals
and made sexually suggestive remarks because the acts did not fall within reasonably
anticipated work conditions).
47. Cf. Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 5 A.2d 10, 12 (Conn. 1939) (finding that a master
derives secondary liability from a servant’s tortious conduct in the course of employment on
policy grounds, while the servant assumes separate primary liability on grounds that he
personally committed wrongful acts).
48. See, e.g., Walter v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(ruling that dual-capacity applies when employers become a third party in relation to the
employee through engaging in independent transactions with nonemployees, such that the
law views the employer as a separate legal person with independent legal duties to its
employees and the nonemployees).
49. See id. (finding that an employer is susceptible to a tort liability if it possesses a
second legal persona, unrelated to its primary status as an employer).
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A. Workers’ Compensation Statutes’ Requirements
Workers’ compensation statutes have a threshold requirement that an
injury must occur.50 Some states require that an employee must suffer
physical injuries to recover under workers’ compensation statutes, while
other states permit recovery on the basis of emotional or psychological
injuries resulting from physical injuries.51 Very few states allow workers’
compensation recovery for strictly nonphysical injuries.52
Moreover, states limit workers’ compensation recovery to accidental
injuries, allowing employees common law causes of action for injuries
sustained as a result of employers’ intentional conduct.53 However, state
courts are split as to whether sexual harassment constitutes intentional or
accidental injury for workers’ compensation exclusivity purposes.54 Some
courts narrowly interpret accident to mean a “mishap or unexpected
event.”55 Other state courts broadly construe accident to mean any act that
the employer does not intentionally commit with a specific intent to
injure.56 Most courts require that an accidental injury must be sudden and
traceable to a particular time, place, and event.57
Furthermore, workers’ compensation statutes have causation
requirements that employee injuries must, in some particular fashion, “arise
out of employment.”58 States apply differing tests to determine whether the
50. See, e.g., Anderton v. Wasteaway Serv. LLC, 880 A.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2005).
51. Compare Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 325 (Ala. 1989) (per
curium) (observing that Alabama’s workers’ compensation laws, which strictly provide
remedies for “physical injuries,” did not bar plaintiff’s common law claims of invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)), with Meyers v. Arcudi,
915 F. Supp. 522, 524 (D. Conn. 1996) (explaining that Connecticut’s workers’
compensation law covers emotional injuries resulting from physical harm).
52. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 102.01(2)(c) (2005).
53. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(d)(2) (2005).
54. Compare American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Board,
144 Cal. Rptr. 898, 900-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an injury is not accidental
under California’s workers’ compensation statute when an employer engages in serious or
willful conduct with a wanton disregard for the consequences), with Orzechowski v.
Warner-Lambert, Co., 92 A.D.2d 110, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (finding that workers’
compensation coverage extends to all accidental injuries, including those arising from
employer’s deliberate or wanton conduct).
55. See, e.g., Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999, 1006 (N.M. 1999) (ruling that
sexual harassment against an employee, which occurred for over a year, was not the result
of a sudden or unexpected accidental event).
56. See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 589 (Ariz. 1987) (explaining that the
intentional exception to the workers’ compensation law does not apply unless an employer
purposefully or knowingly acts with the direct objective of injuring an employee).
57. Cf. Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto, 112 P.3d 1093, 1102 (Nev. 2005) (per
curium) (ruling that the claimant could not recover under Nevada’s workers’ compensation
statutes for a work-related car accident because exacerbation of preexisting symptoms did
not constitute “sudden or unforeseen injuries”).
58. See, e.g., Rinke v. Bank of America, 121 P.2d 472, 476 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); see
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requisite causal connections for recovery under workers’ compensation
exist.59 Most state trial courts allow juries to determine whether an injury
arises out of the employment as a factual matter.60
Most jurisdictions apply an increased-risk test in determining causation,
which is satisfied when employment conditions expose the employee to a
quantitatively greater degree of risk of harm than the general public.61
Many jurisdictions have modified the increased-risk test and applied an
actual-risk test, where the workers’ compensation laws apply when
employers show that the injury was an actual risk of the employment, even
if the hazards were common to both its employees and the general public.62
A growing number of jurisdictions look to the total facts and circumstances
surrounding an employee’s injuries as a part of the positional-risk test,
applying but-for or factual causation in relating employee injuries to an
employer’s conduct.63 In positional-risk jurisdictions, an employer shields
tort liability through the exclusivity doctrine if an employee’s injuries
would not have happened but-for the fact that the employment conditions,
duties, or obligations put the claimant in a hazardous position, exposing her
to a “neutral force.”64
B. State Courts Generally Limit Claimants’ Common Law Actions
Legislators in most states drafted workers’ compensation laws to limit
common law causes of action against employers to instances where
employers engaged in intentional or deliberate conduct and the employee

also 82 AM JUR. 2d Workers’ Compensation § 238 (2006).
59. Compare Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging
in dictum that because Illinois’ workers’ compensation statutes were designed to replace
common law claims, the claimant does not need to show legal or proximate causation, but
must show factual or but-for causation), with Sutter v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Va., 932 F.
Supp. 753, 758-59 (E.D. Va. 1996) (concluding that under Virginia workers’ compensation
statute, an injury arises out of or is caused by employment conditions when an injury can
“fairly” be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause). But see 82 AM
JUR. 2d Workers’ Compensation § 238 (inferring that an injury compensable under workers’
compensation law arises when employment obligations or conditions put employees in a
position or place where an accident occurs, the accident has its origins in a risk connected to
employment, and the injury flows from the natural and rational consequences of that
employment risk).
60. See, e.g., Knox v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 543 A.2d 363, 365 (Me. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Flanner v. Tulsa Pub. Schs., 41 P.3d 972, 976 (Okla. 2002) (Hodges, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that Oklahoma’s legislature rejected the positional-risk and
peculiar-risk doctrines and relied on the increased-risk doctrine to determine whether an
injury arose out of employment).
62. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Case, 445 S.E.2d 105, 106-07 (Va. 1994).
63. See, e.g., Cremen v. Harrah’s Marina Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150, 154-55
(D.N.J. 1988).
64. Cf. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 832 S.W.2d 869, 872-73 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992),
aff’d, 852 S.W.2d 804 (Ark. 1993).
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suffered physical harm.65 As a result, in the absence of an employer’s
exclusivity defense, many state courts apply an alternative action theory
which compels an employee to choose between remedies provided by
workers’ compensation laws or state common law causes of action.66 A
minority of states apply a cumulative action approach, where the sexual
harassment claimant can recover under both common law and workers’
compensation laws.67 Under the cumulative action approach, no-fault
benefits offset damages awarded in tort judgments after the claims are
settled to prevent excessive recovery.68 The remaining state courts apply
the cumulative remedy theory, which allows employees to bring separate
tort and contract causes of action against employers for injuries that are not
covered by workers’ compensation laws.69
V. STATE COMMON LAW TORT AND CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION
State courts that reject the alternative action and cumulative action
theories and instead provide for cumulative remedies, ground their
decisions on the public policy of shielding employees from sexual
harassment related evils such as sexual assault, emotional distress, and
invasions of privacy.70 As a result, courts have permitted employees’
IIED,71 tortious breach of public policy,72 assault and battery,73 and
65. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c) (1985) (providing that an employee can recover
punitive and compensatory damages under common law for compensation in excess of the
statutory cap for injuries resulting from an employer’s deliberate actions).
66. See Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm: Relationship Between Tort
System and No-Fault Compensation (With an Emphasis on Workers’ Compensation), 73
CAL. L. REV. 857, 860 (1985) (explaining that under an alternative action theory some
jurisdictions allow employees to choose between tort actions or no-fault recovery, but in
most jurisdictions the courts or the administrative agency directing the no-fault system
determines employee recovery based on legislative guidelines).
67. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §656.156(2) (2006).
68. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c) (1985) (articulating that when employers
deliberately injure employees, employees or their survivors have a common law cause of
action against employers for any damages exceeding the compensation law’s relief).
69. See, e.g., McCalla v. Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
70. See PALUDI, supra note 27, at 151 (documenting that the courts have been the most
apt forums for combating sexual harassment injuries, including emotional, psychological,
and physical harms, because courts are best situated to remedy disparities between an
aggressor and a victim).
71. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 28, at 352 (discussing that an IIED claim
involves extreme and outrageous conduct with intent to cause or with deliberate disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress, which causes severe emotional distress).
72. Cf. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 71 (Cal. 1990) (ruling that the plaintiffs, who
alleged that their employer’s sexually harassing remarks and requests for sexual favors
forced them to leave their employment, could seek judicial relief for a tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy supported by employment sex discrimination).
73. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 28, at 356 (explaining that as companion
causes of action in sexual harassment cases, assault requires that an actor intended to cause
harmful physical contact and that the claimant was put in apprehension of such contact,
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invasion of privacy74 tort claims against employers for injuries deriving
from hostile work environments. A number of state courts also address bad
faith dealings in “at-will”75 employment relationships by allowing
employees separate common law contract causes of action against
employers who make employment decisions based on employees’ refusals
to submit to sexual advances.76 These state courts allow employees
contractual causes of action based on an implied employment contract,
particularly when the parties agreed to abide by specific employment
terms.77 Under implied contract principles, state courts allow claimants to
bring breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealings78 and contractual
interference causes of actions against employers.79
ANALYSIS
Most workers’ compensation coverage disputes arise from the causation
requirements of the laws’ coverage formula.80 Therefore, the dual-capacity
doctrine can serve as a crucial rebuttal to employers’ exclusivity defense
because an employee can assert that the employer acted outside the
employment relationship by creating or tolerating conditions that resulted
in sexually offensive conduct.81 When an employee can assert that the
while battery requires harmful contact with a person resulting from an act intended to cause
claimant to suffer the contact).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (articulating that an
individual who intentionally intrudes upon another’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs is
liable if that intrusion would highly offend a reasonable person).
75. RICHARD A. LORD, 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:39 (4th ed. 2005) (stating
that an employment relationship, which is indefinite in duration, is terminable at the will of
either party and does not create any executory obligations).
76. See Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Mass. 1977)
(finding an implied covenant of good faith in at-will employment contracts because good
faith and fair dealing are pervasive requirements of Massachusetts state law).
77. See Romero v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 739 F. Supp. 1472, 1478-79
(D.N.M. 1990) (reasoning that the employee’s contractual interference claim was actionable
under an implied contract based on the company’s personnel practices and written
procedures).
78. See Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing the lower court’s summary judgment of plaintiff’s contractual covenant of good
faith claims, where plaintiff asserted that she complained of coworker sexual harassment to
her supervisor and the supervisor took retaliatory action by isolating the claimant from other
workers and eventually suspending her for a week).
79. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 28, at 364 (discussing that a claimant can
prevail under contractual interference by showing either that the harasser interfered with the
complainant’s contractual performance by inducing the employer to discharge her or in
some other manner, but proof of unlawful motive is necessary).
80. See 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKER’S COMPENSATION
LAWS § 6.10 (1997).
81. Cf. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 750 (Cal. 1987) (finding that
the employee could not recover for common law emotional damages ultimately resulting
from employer’s disciplinary actions because the demotion, disciplinary proceedings, and
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employer abrogated the primary employment relationship by creating or
tolerating a work environment causing third-party sexual harassment, the
employee can subsequently argue that the injury cannot be construed to
“arise out” of employment under any of the modern causation tests applied
to workers’ compensation claims.82 Consequently, the employee can
establish that her claim can take the form of a common law torts and
contracts cause of action.83
I. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION FORMULAS ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THIRDPARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS WHERE EMPLOYEES CAN
ESTABLISH THAT THE HARASSMENT DID NOT “ARISE FROM” THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Workers’ Compensation Laws Cannot Cover Third-Party Sexual
Harassment Injuries in Increased-Risk Jurisdictions Where the Injuries Are
Not Exclusive to the Claimant’s Workplace
The exclusivity doctrine should not apply to employee third-party sexual
harassment suits against employers in increased-risk jurisdictions where the
harassment-related injuries pose a threat to the general public.84 To
illustrate, when an employer creates or tolerates a hostile work environment
that ultimately results in third-party sexual misconduct, the threat of sexual
harassment-related injuries will likely proliferate beyond the individual
employee to patrons and other bystanders.85 Moreover, when employee
injuries result from the employer thrusting a hazard upon the general public
by tolerating or creating a sexually hostile work environment, the dualcapacity doctrine should void the employer’s exclusivity defense because
the employer stands as a third party in relation to the injured employee.86
attempted forced retirement arose from the employment relationship).
82. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 80, at § 6.10 (noting that jurisdictions use either
the increased-risk doctrine, actual-risk doctrine, or the positional-risk doctrine to interpret
“arising out of employment”).
83. Cf. Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ohio 1978) (concluding
that a nurse who had become her employer’s patient as a result of mercury poisoning
contracted at work could sue to recover tort damages for medical malpractice under the
dual-capacity doctrine when the hospital failed to properly diagnose her ailment).
84. Cf. Kemp v. Indus. Comm’n, 636 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(determining that workers’ compensation coverage under the increased-risk test applied
because the claimant’s job duties required him to bend and stoop extensively on uneven
ground, which would not be expected among the general public).
85. See Navy Investigating Alleged Misconduct at Latest Tailhook Convention,
CNN.COM, Aug. 25, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/08/25/tailhook.allegations.02/
index.html (documenting the widespread misconduct during the Tailhook Association
Convention where lack of oversight allowed naval aviators to drink excessively, expose
themselves to females, and grope dozens of female officers and hotel employees).
86. Cf. Bell v. Indus. Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 280 (Cal. 1981) (ruling that a
manufacturer could not escape product liability as to its employees when it would be liable
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Specifically, the employer acts in a dual capacity because the abrogated
employment relationship is separate from and incidental to the duties the
employer breached in its relationship with the general public.87 Finally,
sexual harassment is not an increased risk of employment when the third
party extends its sexually offensive conduct outside of the employee’s
workplace.88
Additionally, public policy mandates that an employer who fosters a
sexually hostile work environment and violates separate relationships with
its employees and the general public in promoting pervasively detrimental
conduct must be denied no-fault legislation’s benefits.89 Employers who
tolerate or perpetuate third-party sexual harassment must be held fully
liable because they intentionally create or are deliberately indifferent
towards hazardous conditions that are likely to cause widespread harm to
the general public, in addition to its employees.90 Further, an employer’s
detrimental conduct, which affects individuals involved in independent
relationships with that employer, can most effectively be shown through
the dual-capacity doctrine.91 In piercing the employer’s exclusivity
defense, an employee is given an opportunity to demonstrate harms the
employer caused in each of its distinct relationships.92
B. The Dual-Capacity Doctrine Will Bar Employers’ Exclusivity Defense in
Actual-Risk Jurisdictions
In jurisdictions applying the actual-risk test, the dual-capacity doctrine
to other injured parties because the manufacturer assumed a dual persona with separate
obligations to its employees and to its clients).
87. Cf. Murcia v. Textron Inc., 795 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that
the employee failed to allege facts necessary to avail himself of the dual-capacity doctrine
because he did not show that his employer assumed an independent legal obligation when it
changed or modified the machinery that injured him).
88. See, e.g., Anderson v. Save-A-Lot Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 287-88 (Tenn. 1999).
89. Cf. Abbott v. Jarrett Reclamation Serv., Inc., 726 N.E.2d 511, 520-22 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999) (arguing that employers cannot cower behind no-fault legislation and escape
common law liability when they know that employees’ chances of injury are more probable
because they allowed detrimental conduct to continue).
90. See, e.g., Peterson v. Arlington Hospitality Staffing, Inc., 689 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2004) (asserting that employer actions are not covered by workers’ compensation
when the employer intentionally injures its employees in sexual harassment suits because
the burden of compensating the employee should not fall on the public and the employee
should be allowed broad common law recovery).
91. See 40 AM. JUR. Proof Of Facts 2d § 603, at § 2.0 (2005) (asserting that when an
employee claims that the employer acted in a dual-capacity, the employee can demonstrate
during trial how the employer behaved in its different capacities).
92. Cf. Longever v. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857, 858-59 (Mass.
1980) (determining that, in asserting the dual-capacity doctrine, the injured employee was
able to show that the employer failed to provide its employees with safe equipment, but this
did not suffice to establish dual capacity because manufacturing the equipment to be used by
employees does not create a separate legal identity for the employer).
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should also void employers’ exclusivity defenses to third-party sexual
harassment claims where the injury arises from a breach of duty the
employer owes to the employee in the context of a separate and
independent relationship.93 For example, when an employer engages in
unrelated business transactions with independent contractors but maintains
a hostile work environment in the employee’s workplace where the
contractor has an opportunity to engage in third-party sexual harassment,
the dual-capacity doctrine should apply because the threat cannot be
classified as an actual risk of employment.94 More precisely, an employer
may contract with outside agencies or workers with the intention of
confining the newly formed independent relationship to an employee’s
workplace, thus eliminating the possibility that the independent
contractors’ sexual harassment will affect the general public.95
Common law liability in actual-risk jurisdictions is also appropriate
when employers assume separate roles as managers or shareholders and as
a distinct corporate entity in the context of corporations.96 If employees are
injured by third-party sexual harassment resulting from a shareholder or
management created hostile work environment, workers’ compensation
exclusivity should not bar common law remedies against the management
or shareholders in their individual capacities because those particular
hazards are likely limited to employees.97 In fact, applying the dualcapacity doctrine to impute common law liability on employers assuming
various distinctive legal identities for business advantages is particularly
important given the sharp rise in the creation and utilization of legally

93. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts, supra note 16, at § 1.2 (advancing that the dualcapacity doctrine applies when the employer, in its alternate capacity, owes the employee
obligations that are unrelated to those obligations imposed as a result of its primary status as
an employer).
94. Cf. Bell v. Indus. Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 280 (Cal. 1981) (finding that a
“coincidental employment relationship” did not preclude an employer’s common law
liability when a simultaneous cause of injury could be attributed to a distinct relationship of
an employer with an employee).
95. See, e.g., Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *1-2, 7 (D.Kan.
Aug. 24, 1994) (holding that the plaintiff, employed by one of the independent doctors
under contract with her hospital employer, could bring a third-party sexual harassment suit
against the hospital after the doctor left sex-related articles on her desk because the hospital
had a legal responsibility over the independent contractor’s actions and had permitted the
harassment to continue unabated).
96. Cf. Hagan v. Terry Corp., Inc., No. 2002-CA-001000-MR, 2003 WL 22271514, at 3
(Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2003) (rationalizing that corporations are distinct entities from their
shareholders and officers, but that shareholders may be held liable in their individual
capacities under the dual-capacity doctrine).
97. Cf. Cole v. Golemi, 271 So. 2d 65, 67-68 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (concluding that the
defendant who was a corporate shareholder and officer was distinct from the actual
corporate entity and could be liable under tort law because his actions were entitled to tort
immunity, but the corporation, and not the defendant, would be liable as a principal under
worker’s compensation laws).
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fictitious entities to shield individuals’ liability.98 Distinguishing partners’
or shareholders’ individual roles from the legal entity via the dual-capacity
doctrine will likely allow courts to ascertain through a factual inquiry
whether the individual sought to simultaneously exercise “control”99 over
the legal entity while duplicitously shielding himself from personal liability
by misusing the legal veil against individual liability provided to the
fictitious business entity.100 Furthermore, disallowing individual partners,
shareholders, or managers from usurping an entity’s liability veil will likely
stymie the individual from abusing corporate or partnership
indemnification systems, which provide business entities vital insurance
coverage to cover the business entity’s costs of litigation and damages.101
C. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Will Not Apply in Positional-Risk
Jurisdictions Where Specific Employee Characteristics or Workplace
Conditions Trigger Third-Party Sexual Harassment
Third-party sexual harassment claims present unique challenges to
employers attempting to invoke the exclusivity doctrine in jurisdictions
applying the positional-risk test.102 In these jurisdictions employers must
show that, although they knew or should have known of the third party’s
sexual harassment, they had insufficient control over the third party’s
behavior, and thus they should not face common law liability.103 Given
98. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (2005); see also Notes, RiskPreference Asymmetries in Class Action Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2005)
(opining that firms as legal fictions are more likely to engage in risky behavior because
stakeholder pressure for results and liability insurance eschew managerial caution towards
uncertainties, “including those posed by civil litigation”); AM JUR. Partnership § 851, 866
(2005) (stating that state law allows for the formation of limited partnerships where
individuals, upon compliance with statutory requirements, may contribute certain amounts
of capital to the partnership and limit their liability to those sums, but the partnership must
have at least one general partner with unlimited liability).
99. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 143 (defining legal control as the
power to directly or indirectly commandeer an entity’s management or policies through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise).
100. See, e.g., Hommel v. Micco, 602 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(acknowledging that statutory limitations on individual liability allow corporate officers to
misrepresent their role in their corporations, so courts have held that a corporate officer will
be liable in his individual capacity where he fails to clearly identify the capacity in which he
is engaging a party).
101. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(d) (A) & (B) (2006) (mandating
that a registered Limited Liability Partnership must carry at least $100,000 of liability
insurance designed to cover the partnership’s liability from its negligence, malfeasance,
errors, incompetence, or omissions, and the partnership must designate and segregate
$100,000 for the specific purpose of satisfying judgments against it).
102. See, e.g., Mintiks v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, 550 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145-46 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990).
103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1999) (permitting employer liability where employers
know or should know of third-party sexual harassment but fail to terminate the sexual
harassment by taking prompt corrective action).
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that the burden of proof in most jurisdictions is on the employer to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the exclusivity doctrine applies,
employers will have difficulty showing that they did not have control over
third-party conduct in instances where employers invite customers and
independent contractors into the workplace as a part of routine commercial
activities.104 In addition, an employer will have difficulty asserting that a
third party’s harassing conduct was a “neutral force” that was not personal
to the claimant nor causally connected with employment conditions when
the employee’s personal characteristics or the particular work environment
specifically triggered the third-party sexual harassment.105
II. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY SHOULD NOT APPLY WHERE
WORKPLACE INJURIES ARE NOT ACCIDENTAL
The exclusivity doctrine should not apply in jurisdictions that condition
workers’ compensation recovery on whether the employer-designed events
leading to injury were foreseeable.106 A claimant will likely foresee and
expect sexual harassment in instances where the employer creates a hostile
work environment because claimants will likely expect sexually offensive
conduct under sexually oppressive conditions.107 Specifically, an employer
will face significant difficulty asserting that an employee could not have
foreseen or expected events when the employer designs personnel policies
that encourage abusive relationships between its employees and clients or
when the employer designs business strategies that will likely expose its
employees to the perverse whims of unsavory third parties.108
Jurisdictions requiring an employer to demonstrate that worker injuries
occurred from usual exposure to employment conditions should not permit
employers to assert that an employee’s injuries occurred from usual
exposure to job duties when the worker is subjected to the dangers of
hostile work environment sexual harassment.109 Moreover, a defendant
will likely have difficulty showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
workers’ compensation statutes preclude all common law actions when the
104. See, e.g., Lentz v. Young, 536 N.W.2d 451, 456-58 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
105. See Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath, 606 S.E.2d 567, 571 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); see
also LARSON & LARSON, supra note 80, at § 3.05.
106. See De Arman v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 61 So. 2d 764, 767 (Ala. 1952).
107. See Motorist Mutual Ins. Co. v. Merrick, Nos. 98-T-0188, 98-T-0189, 1999 WL
1073666, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999).
108. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 684 A.2d 66, 75-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(determining that an injury is not accidental and is expected where the court can infer
employer intent to injure from repetitive actions); see also 99 C.J.S. Workers’
Compensation § 295 (2005) (finding that workers’ compensation only applies when other
individuals design an injury causing event and the worker does not expect the event).
109. See Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999, 1005-06 (N.M. 1999); see also
Vance, supra note 10, at 166 (positing that courts have found that an intentional tort severs
an employment relationship at the moment the employer commits the intentional tort).
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third party’s sexually harassing conduct occurs over a period of time,
making it impossible to determine a definite time, place, or cause of an
employee’s injuries.110 Finally, an employer will have difficulty asserting
that a third party’s conduct resulted in an accidental injury in deliberate
indifference jurisdictions, where courts view an employer’s failure to
promptly terminate the hostile work environment as a deliberate action,
because most compensation statutes do not cover employer’s deliberate
indifference.111
III. JURISDICTIONS LIMITING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION RECOVERY TO
PHYSICAL INJURIES SHOULD PROVIDE CLAIMANTS
COMMON LAW RELIEF FOR NONPHYSICAL INJURIES
A. State Courts Should Consider Workers’ Compensation Laws’ And
Common Laws’ Underlying Policies When Determining Workers’
Compensation Exclusivity
Workers’ compensation laws that prohibit recovery for nonphysical
injuries are inadequate as the claimant’s sole means for recovery in thirdparty sexual harassment situations because these narrow statutes will likely
preclude all relief when the claimant suffers strictly nonphysical injuries.112
This is especially troublesome when an employer intentionally creates a
hostile work environment that exposes an employee to nonphysical harms,
and the employee must prove a specific intent to injure in order to recover
common law damages.113 In these situations, courts will effectively deny
any recovery when the employee cannot show employer intent to create a
hostile work environment because the employer will be able to assert that
injuries related to derivative liability, a negligence theory, are exclusively
covered by workers’ compensation laws.114 Courts will then apply the state
workers’ compensation laws as the sole remedy for the perceived
110. Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 584-85 (Ariz. 1987); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 72-102(18)(b) (2006) (stating that an “accident” is an unexpected or undesigned event that
can reasonably be located as to the time and place where it occurred).
111. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3602(a) & (b)(1) (2005); see also Ford, 734 P.2d at 58485.
112. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 80, at § 68.34(a) (positing that workers’
compensation should not constitute the exclusive remedy when the injury’s essence is
nonphysical because most state legislatures crafted compensation laws during the industrial
revolution, and thus intended to confine relief to purely physical injuries).
113. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pratt, 585 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(announcing that employers cannot successfully assert workers’ compensation exclusivity
when employee injuries result from intentional activities during the course of business); see
also 76 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 16, at § 21 (observing that many third-party
sexual harassment cases result from employer dress codes requiring female employees to
wear revealing outfits that provoke clients’ sexual aggression).
114. See, e.g., Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(recognizing that derivative claims are precluded by Illinois workers’ compensation laws).
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unintentional acts.115 Ultimately, the applicable workers’ compensation
laws will categorically deny employees’ remedies for nonphysical injuries,
thus denying the employee any recovery.116
State courts should look beyond technicalities regarding the physical or
nonphysical nature of a claimant’s injuries.117 Instead, courts should focus
on workers’ compensation laws’ and common law regimes’ purposes.118
Otherwise, claimants must allege physical injuries resulting from mental
and emotional trauma in jurisdictions that do not permit common law
recoveries for purely nonphysical harm.119 Subsequently, the plaintiff’s
allegation of physical injuries will bar common law recovery because an
employer will be able to assert that workers’ compensation laws constitute
the exclusive remedy.120 Finally, where common law recovery for
nonphysical injuries is categorically proscribed, employees forced to allege
physical injuries as a means of recovery under workers’ compensation laws
will likely fail in their compensation claims.121 Employees’ physical injury
claims will likely be viewed as tenuous and inadequately supported, and
they will probably not stand the scrutiny of the employer’s medical
experts.122
B. Courts Also Should Consider Employer Intent when Determining
Whether Employees Can Recover Cumulative Remedies
Jurisdictions limiting workers’ compensation recovery strictly to
physical injuries should instead focus on employer intent regarding the
sexual harassment, in conjunction with the public policy purposes
115. See Vance, supra note 10, at 193 (asserting that derivative liability claims, such as
respondeat superior and negligent hiring, constitute negligent torts covered by workers’
compensation laws).
116. See Juarez v. American Mobile Commc’n, 746 F. Supp. 798, 806 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
117. See Vance, supra note 10, at 186 (maintaining that more state courts should adopt
the Michigan and Florida courts’ practice of looking to the state’s torts and compensation
policies, instead of making physical-nonphysical distinctions).
118. Cf. Moll v. Parkside Livonia Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786, 791-92 (E.D. Mich.
1981).
119. See Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433, 434-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(ruling that a seamstress could recover for the neurosis resulting from her skin bruise
because she had an actual physical injury upon which to base compensation for her mental
harms).
120. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 39-71-119(1)(a) (2005).
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.093(1) (2003) (stating that workers’ compensation
only covers claimants’ mental injuries that result from physical trauma). But see Watson,
106 So. 2d at 435 (ruling that under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws, the physical
injury requirement should be expanded to allow compensation for mental injuries caused by
physical trauma that result in negligible physical consequences).
122. See Jones v. Trailor, 636 So. 2d 1112, 1117-18, 1120 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that an employee could not recover under workers’ compensation law for past medical
expenses because she failed to provide adequate physician testimony in response to her
employer’s denials).
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supporting state workers’ compensation laws, to determine whether the
exclusivity doctrine applies.123 This approach will allow third-party sexual
harassment injuries resulting from employer’s intentional actions to shift
from an inapt no-fault forum to a distinct and more appropriate common
law forum.124 Shifting employees’ causes of action to a common law
forum will ensure that employers deservedly incur fault for their
intentionally tortious or deliberately indifferent conduct.125
States with workers’ compensation statutes that limit claimants’ common
law recovery to physical injuries should broaden their interpretation of
intentional torts within the sexual harassment context to permit a common
law recovery with a showing of wanton, willful, or malicious negligence.126
This approach best adheres to hostile work environment’s imputed
knowledge standard because an employer who “should have known” of
sexual harassment is deemed to have willfully, maliciously, or wantonly
allowed third-party sexual harassment to continue without having the
specific intent required in intentional tort claims.127 Finally, an employee
injury loses its accidental character when an employer willfully,
maliciously, or wantonly injures that employee.128
IV. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION STATUTES’ LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS
IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE IMPETUS DRIVING SEX
DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Workers’ Compensation Laws Are Incapable of Achieving Title VII’s
Purposes of Combating Sex-Based Employment Discrimination
State workers’ compensation laws were formulated as social insurance
mechanisms that imputed strict liability to employers in response to rising
123. See Vance, supra note 10, at 186 (arguing that courts should look at the employer’s
underlying conduct to determine whether the injurious acts were intentional or deliberate
instead of applying the traditional “nature of injury” test).
124. See Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec. Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102-04 (Fla.
1989).
125. See id. at 1102-04.
126. See, e.g., Mayles v. Shoney’s Inc., 405 S.E.2d 15, 18-19 (W. Va. 1990)
(establishing that under West Virginia’s “deliberate intent” standard, an employer loses
immunity from common law suits when its actions constitute an intentional tort or wanton,
willful, or deliberate misconduct).
127. See Joel L. Finger, Controlling the Costs of Litigation, 464 P.L.I. LIT. 89, 97 (1993)
(finding that most liability policies expressly exclude willful conduct and other intentional
acts from coverage). But see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 80, at § 68.00 (rejecting that
common law liability should be stretched to include accidental injuries by gross, wanton,
willful, deliberate, culpable, or malicious negligence of an employer).
128. Cf. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So. 2d 618, 619-21 (La. 1984) (ruling that
employees can recover under common law by showing that the employer knew to
substantial certainty that its acts, which violated safety regulations, were likely to cause the
injury-inducing explosion).
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industrial accidents in the early twentieth century and are fundamentally
incapable of covering modern day third-party sexual harassment
disputes.129 Clearly, legislators did not intend to include civil rights-type
litigation within the context of compensation laws’ social insurance
schemes.130 Accordingly, legislative history favoring elimination of sexual
harassment as a means of eviscerating workplace sex-based discrimination
is vastly different from the legislative considerations underlying workers’
compensation laws.131 For instance, state legislatures passed compensation
laws with the intent of ensuring that employees received monetary
compensation for diminished earning power, medical expenses, and
vocational rehabilitation, where workplace technological developments and
evolving commercial interests rendered common law remedies impractical
or undesirable.132 Contrastingly, Title VII was passed out of discontent
with deeply embedded social inequalities and structural discrimination
against minorities and women.133 These disparate legislative motives are
manifested in workers’ compensation laws’ no-fault nature.134 For
example, no-fault legislation narrows relief for negligent infliction of
physical injury without considering employees’ nonphysical injuries or
employers’ actions specifically intended to expose an insular group to
disparate treatment and adverse work conditions.135
B. Society Should Reject that Sexual Harassment Injuries Are an Expected
Fact of the Modern Workplace
Courts should exempt third-party sexual harassment injuries from the
129. See Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F.Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
130. See Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tenn. 1999) (“[T]he
concerns addressed by [Civil Rights Statutes] are quite different from those addressed by the
workers’ compensation laws and . . . the way to maintain public policies against sexual
harassment on the job is to pursue the common-law or statutory remedies available to
promote these policies and not to engraft those policies on to a very different legislative
scheme such as the Workers’ Compensation Act.”).
131. See Vance, supra note 10, at 190-91 (observing that sexual harassment injuries must
be viewed differently from workers’ compensation injuries because workers’ compensation
recovery will not give effect to the compelling Title VII policies against employment
discrimination and most sexual harassment does not result in “compensable disabilities”).
132. See, e.g., Freeman, 469 F. Supp. at 1000 (conceding that Michigan’s workers’
compensation statutes were only meant to redress industrial injuries and to replace
antiquated common law remedies).
133. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
134. See Symposium, Ideological and Cultural Influences on Work and Benefits Law, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1993) (arguing that workers’ compensation should not be the
exclusive remedy for sexual harassment because sexual harassment is an unacceptable
byproduct of the workplace, where compensation laws’ dispute resolution mechanisms
trivialize fault, and, consequently, sexual harassment is not deterred or eliminated).
135. See Love, supra note 66, at 857-58 (observing that legislative bodies fashioning
workers’ compensation statutes did not consider whether no-fault legislation would apply to
purely nonphysical injuries because the plans were silent on the subject).
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exclusivity doctrine in states that seek to limit workers’ compensation to
injuries that are “a fact of life of industrial employment.”136 Sexual
harassment laws’ aggressive attempts at terminating workplace gender
inequality manifestly demonstrate that society should reject the notion that
sexual harassment-related injuries are an acceptable occurrence in
employment relationships.137 Sexual harassment law is judge-made case
law interpreting and applying Title VII’s ban on sex-based
discrimination.138 Therefore, limiting all third-party sexual harassment
claims to the workers’ compensation realm undermines the civil rights
impetus and equal opportunity justifications for sexual harassment
jurisprudence.139 Ultimately, accepting sexual harassment as an expected
fact of employment would undermine the legitimacy of the courts’ arduous
development of sexual harassment case law since Title VII’s passage and
retard further efforts to ensure workplace equality because the absence of
clear policy objectives and congressional purposes behind judicial
decisions is more likely to propagate the perception of an unrestrained and
activist judiciary.140
V. CLAIMANT’S STATE COMMON LAW TORTS AND CONTRACTS
CAUSES OF ACTION
A. States Should Adopt the Cumulative Remedy Theory so Third-Party
Sexual Harassment Claimants Have Access to Common Law Tort Recovery
for Claims that Workers’ Compensation Laws Do Not Adequately Cover
State tort law should apply to employers that intentionally create or
remain indifferent towards third-party sexual harassment, which ultimately
results in employees’ physical, mental, and dignitary injuries that workers’
compensation laws may not fully cover.141 Allowing claimants cumulative
136. See Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1985).
137. See Cremen v. Harrah’s Marina Hotel Casino, 680 F. Supp. 150, 159 (D.N.J. 1988).
138. See 76 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 331, supra note 16, at § 1 (positing that courts
came to understand that an employer that permits severe or pervasive harassment because of
employee gender is discriminating against the employee in violation of Title VII).
139. See Ronald Turner, Making Title VII Law and Policy: The Supreme Court’s Sexual
Harassment Jurisprudence, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 578 (2005) (acknowledging
that courts have created a fundamental public value opposing workplace harassment by
using Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination to craft a body of sexual harassment case law as
a form of “Quasi-legislative judicial gap-filling”).
140. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares on Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 51 (1998) (asserting that questions of judicial legitimacy
remain even if judges possess the technical knowledge to make value judgments because
traditional separation of powers theory holds that the judiciary must interpret and not make
law, and a democratic citizenry will reject “unfettered and subjective judicial activism”).
141. See McCalla v. Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that
the claimant had a cognizable civil action for IIED resulting from workplace discrimination
because compensation laws do not cover emotional and dignitary harms).
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remedies most closely comports with the exclusivity doctrine’s purposes
because workers’ compensation exclusivity depends on whether the
employee can fully recover under a state’s compensation statute, rendering
common law remedies obsolete.142 Sexual harassment injuries often fall
outside the scope of workers’ compensation statutes, particularly when
employees suffer nonphysical injuries in addition to physical harms.143
Furthermore, the cumulative remedy theory adheres to the no-fault values
embedded in workers’ compensation laws because it limits workers’
compensation recoveries solely to legitimate employment related injuries
while allowing common law damages for claims that have traditionally
been addressed under common law theories.144
As a policy matter, employers must be held liable under state common
law torts for the wrongs committed against those with whom it voluntarily
transacts business.145 Imputed liability is appropriate where the employer
knows or should have known that the risk of harm to its employees was
significant in light of the third party’s characteristics vis-à-vis the
employees’ work conditions.146 In fact, lawmakers and courts have
prudently recognized that employers are in the best position to protect their
employees from third-party misconduct.147 Accordingly, courts justifiably
impute common law liability to employers involved in joint enterprises
with third parties or employers who profit from third-party patronage.148
142. See, e.g., Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983) (arguing that workers’ compensation exclusivity is not contingent on the
characteristics of the cause of action but is based on whether the compensation laws give the
employee a right to recover benefits).
143. See id. (noting that mental anguish such as humiliation, embarrassment, and outrage
that flow from discrimination induced injuries fall outside compensation laws’ scope).
144. See Love, supra note 135, at 878-79 (positing that the cumulative remedy theory
permits sexual harassment claimants recovery for work-related disabilities under workers’
compensation laws and provides tort damages for mental anguish and other unrelated
dignitary harms).
145. See 2 CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 12940 (j)(1) (2004) (“An employer may also be
responsible for the acts of third parties, with respect to sexual harassment of employees,
applicants, or persons providing services pursuant to a contract in the workplace, where the
employer, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of the conduct and fails
to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 509 (1984) (observing that commentators have called for
employers’ vicarious liability for independent contractors’ torts because employers
primarily benefit from the relationship, they can demand indemnity from the independent
contractors, and the employer usually initiates the commercial transaction).
146. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411(a) & (b) (1965) (stating that an employer
who fails to exercise reasonable care in employing a careful and competent contractor will
be subject to liability to others for that third-party contractor’s misconduct).
147. See Western Stock Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045, 1048-50 (Colo. 1978).
148. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(finding that a building manager and his contracted cleaning agency faced joint liability for
requiring the claimant to wear an attractive uniform, which due to its revealing nature,
subjected the claimant to customer sexual harassment).
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1. State Courts Should Permit Tort Causes of Action Against
Employers when Third-Party Sexual Harassment Inflicts
Emotional Distress on Employees
Claimants seeking to recover damages for emotional injuries from thirdparty sexual harassment should be allowed a tort cause of action against
their employers for an IIED claim.149 An employer that encourages or fails
to terminate conditions resulting in third-party sexual harassment often
exposes an employee to emotionally damaging abusive language or
behavior.150 More precisely, access to common law emotional distress
claims is appropriate in sexual harassment cases where third parties’
abusive language or behavior is sufficiently outrageous to an employee of
ordinary sensibilities.151 In such actions, a trier of fact must determine
whether an employee of ordinary sensibilities would have found the thirdparty sexual harassment sufficiently outrageous.152 This standard is
particularly appropriate given that one determines the existence and extent
of emotional injuries from the facts and circumstances of each individual
case.153
Moreover, employees claiming emotional injuries from third-party
sexual harassment will justly benefit from a tort action because a factual
inquiry into whether the harassment constituted sufficiently outrageous
conduct would make it difficult for employers to achieve a motion for
summary judgment.154 Consequently, an employee will likely receive a
trial.155 An employer facing the prospects of a protracted trial will be more
amenable to settling the claimant’s third-party sexual harassment suit
149. See Crihfield v. Monsanto Co., 844 F. Supp. 371, 374-78 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(concluding that the IIED claims were not barred by Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws
because the employer failed to stop repeated acts of unwelcome sexual advances).
150. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (determining that
psychological injury can be as severe and debilitating as physical harm, so courts must
recognize employees’ cause of action against an employer who inflicts such pain).
151. See Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Civil Liability for Insulting or Abusive
Language-Modern Status, 20 A.L.R.4th 773 (2004) (recognizing that a great weight of
authority supports a cause of action for abusive language if it is sufficiently outrageous to
cause emotional trauma to a person with normal sensibilities, which in turn produces
physical injury).
152. See, e.g., Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2 1337, 1343 (Wyo. 1997).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 283(c) (1965) (stating that the reasonable
person standard enables a trier of fact to look to community standards, which constitutes a
flexible formula that takes into account individual differences and the particular facts and
circumstances of each case).
154. See, e.g., GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex. 1999) (stressing that a
court must determine whether a defendant’s conduct may be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery, but where reasonable minds may differ, a jury must
determine if the conduct is sufficiently outrageous and extreme).
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (establishing that the moving party has the burden of
showing no genuine issues as to material fact and that reviewing courts must examine the
record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant).
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outside of court.156 Thus, the employee will have bargaining leverage that
can be utilized to obtain a more satisfactory settlement than he or she
would have otherwise received under the workers’ compensation law.157
Moreover, an employer unwilling to settle a third-party sexual
harassment suit outside of court faces significant obstacles at trial because
hostile work environments make IIED claims’ traditionally difficult
“outrageous” element easier to prove.158 Employees will likely succeed in
imputing liability to employers for repetitive third-party sexual harassment
because state courts are more likely to find that persistent harassment
constitutes sufficiently “outrageous” conduct.159 For example, state trial
courts have readily found employers liable for claimants’ third-party sexual
harassment-related emotional injuries when employers failed to promulgate
grievance procedures that would enable employees to report third-party
sexual misconduct.160
State courts also should not require a simultaneous physical
manifestation of emotional trauma for claimants to assert a prima facie
IIED claim.161 A contemporaneous showing of bodily injury with
emotional harm is excessively burdensome for claimants alleging
emotional harm from third-party sexual harassment because subsequent
physical ailments may not appear until the statute of limitations has
expired.162 Given that emotional injuries are sometimes the sole result of
third-party sexual harassment, requiring claimants to demonstrate physical
injuries has the same deleterious effect on employees’ nonphysical claims
as the requirements of past workers’ compensation statutes.163
156. See JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION APPENDIX P § A(1)(a) (3d
ed. 2005) (articulating that mediation and neutral evaluations in alternative dispute
resolution probe beyond legal issues, positions, and rights and help identify positions that
give rise to solutions more satisfactory to both parties).
157. See Randy A. Decker, Economics and Litigation: View from the Inside Looking
Out, 24. 4 LITIG. 36, 38 (1998) (finding that once parties determine that the facts and
existing law warrant a settlement, attorneys can develop a settlement at a lesser cost during a
dispute’s early stages as compared to after parties devote substantial financial resources
towards litigation).
158. See Dias v. Sky Chefs Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming that the
jury correctly considered the employment context in which the alleged sexual harassment
was committed in determining the conduct’s outrageousness), vacated on other grounds 501
U.S. 1201 (1999).
159. See Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984) (ruling that the claimant
made a prima facie IIED claim by demonstrating repeated sexual harassment and that
evidence exhibiting repeated harassment was sufficient for a jury to find that the employer
intentionally or deliberately created a hostile work environment).
160. See, e.g., Payton v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 678 A.2d 279, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996).
161. See, e.g., Versland v. Caron Transp., 671 P.2d 583, 587 (Mont. 1983).
162. See West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
163. Cf. Seto v. Willits, 638 A.2d 258, 352-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that the
claimant who mentally blocked out the sexual assaults could not toll the statute of
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2. State Courts Should Allow Third-Party Sexual Harassment
Claimants to Bring Invasion of Privacy Causes of Action
State courts should permit claimants a common law invasion of privacy
claim against an employer who knows or should have known of third-party
sexual harassment leading to the invasion of privacy, but who failed to
promptly terminate the hostile work conditions fostering the conduct.164
An employee’s common law invasion of privacy claim will particularly
apply in jurisdictions where courts have broadly construed the term to
include physical intrusions and verbal overtures, such as sexual touching
and sexual propositions, in addition to the traditionally recognized property
and other intangible intrusions.165 An employee should also have a
common law invasion of privacy claim against an employer when the
hostile work environment leads to revelations about an employee’s private
parts or intimate information to third parties.166
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,167 which first recognized a right to privacy from particular
government intrusions, provides a compelling justification for a common
law tort invasion of privacy claim in the third-party sexual harassment
context.168 In essence, the Griswold Court recognized a right to sexual
privacy, establishing judicially-fashioned social policy that renders
unconstitutional unwelcomed intrusions into individuals’ private sex lives,
both inside and outside the home.169
limitations for her nonphysical harms because Pennsylvania’s reasonable diligence
requirement is an objective standard and the time it took the claimant to recognize her
injuries was unreasonable). But see Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989)
(concluding that claimants suffering emotional trauma can toll the statute of limitations
when they knew of the abuse but did not understand its connection to later emotional and
physical difficulties).
164. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 28, at 357.
165. See, e.g., Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)
(concluding that touching a female employee’s breasts, legs, and buttocks clearly supported
an invasion of privacy claim).
166. See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala.
1983); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(d) (1977) (explaining that one who
publicizes the private life of another should be liable for invasion of privacy if the
publicized matter would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not the public’s
legitimate concern).
167. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
168. See id. at 485-86 (recognizing that the right to use contraception is a fundamental
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to privacy, and this right of privacy is
found in the “penumbras” of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights).
169. See id. at 495; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“To say that
the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual
act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior.”); Bryan M. Tallevi, Protected
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Although the Griswold Court’s judicially-created right to sexual privacy
has been limited to governmental actions, the decision’s fundamental
principles should nonetheless guide state courts determining whether an
employee can assert a common law invasion of privacy claim.170 For
instance, an employer who creates a hostile work environment facilitates a
third party’s sexual intrusion into an employee’s sexual sanctity,
undermining the employee’s liberty to determine her own sexual fate.171 In
light of the Griswold decision showing immense respect toward
reproductive autonomy and sexual privacy, state courts should hold
employers who expose employees to third-party sexual harassment liable
for invasion of privacy because the revelations are not the public’s concern,
and such disclosures are very likely to be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.172
3. State Courts Should Impute Common Law Assault and Battery
Claims to Employers Who Intentionally or Deliberately Create or
Tolerate a Hostile Work Environment
An employee’s common law assault and battery claims against an
employer for physical injuries suffered from third-party sexual harassment
are most vulnerable to the exclusivity doctrine, but these claims should
succeed under certain circumstances.173 As a matter of prudent policy,
courts should hold employers strictly liable for common law assault and
battery claims when employers intentionally create or deliberately tolerate
a hostile work environment that subjects employees to sexually offensive
physical harm.174 Applying strict liability to employers for third-party
assault and battery, where the intentionally created employment conditions
Conduct and Visual Pleasure: A Discursive Analysis of Lawrence and Barnes, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1131, 1141-42 (2005) (positing that the Griswold Court recognized that a
fundamental right to sexual privacy deserves protection outside of the residential confines
and within the home).
170. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (articulating that liberty presumes autonomy of the
self, which includes freedom to engage in certain intimate conduct, and this personal liberty
can be spatial or it can transcend physical dimensions).
171. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (noting that matters
involving the most important and personal choices a person may make, which are central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty
interest).
172. See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2097 (2001)
(asserting that privacy torts limit individual liberty of action in the interest of enforcing
common social norms and protecting claimant’s dignity).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 469 So. 2d 155, 159 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (finding that workers’ compensation laws exclusively covered employee’s
injuries from a supervisor who assaulted her by grabbing her breast).
174. See Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989)
(noting that applying workers’ compensation exclusivity to assault and battery within a
sexual harassment context violates worker’s compensation laws’ legislative intent and
abrogates policies underlying tort law).
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provide third parties an opportunity to engage in sexually offensive
conduct, adheres to current trends recognizing an employment agreement
as a unique relationship with special obligations.175 In addition, strict
liability for employers in cases of third-party sexual assault and battery is
especially important because an employee’s physical constitution, health,
and safety are under heightened danger in instances of sexual misconduct,
constituting inherent dangerousness.176 This argument is based on the tort
axiom that demands an elevated standard of care or conduct for those who
maintain a dangerous agency involving a high degree of risk that can
reasonably be foreseen under the circumstances.177 Even in jurisdictions
that do not apply the strict liability doctrine, an employer who intentionally
maintains sexually hostile work conditions should foresee a high risk of
sexual misconduct by his or her guests against respective employees.178
Therefore, employers should be held to a higher standard of care in the
jurisdictions that do not apply strict liability.179
4. Employees’ Tortious Breach of Public Policy Claims for ThirdParty Sexual Harassment Are Appropriate when Employers Take
Adversarial Employment Actions for Employees’ Resistance to
Third-Party Sexual Harassment
State courts should allow common law tortious breach of public policy
causes of action against employers who maliciously or in bad faith dismiss
employees for not succumbing to third-party sexual harassment.180 In fact,
175. Cf. Mangeris v. Gordon, 580 P.2d 481, 483 (Nev. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that a
defendant has a duty to warn foreseeable claimants of foreseeable harms in cases where the
defendant bears a special relationship to the claimants or to the dangerous persons). But see
1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDHALL, MODERN TORT LAW LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §3.10
(Supp. 1996) (assessing that courts are sharply split on imputing common law liability to
reasonable people with a duty to foresee that others might violate the law and with a duty to
take precautions against such violations).
176. See RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) TORTS § 520(e) & (f) (1965); see also Beth A.
Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining, Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work
World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1154 (2000) (finding that sexual harassment claimants
suffer from severe health effects such as anxiety, nervousness, sleeplessness, depression,
and lowered satisfaction with life).
177. See LEE & LINDENHALL, supra note 175, at § 3.15. But see Sasha Ransom, How
Far is Too Far? Balancing Sexual Harassment Policies and Reasonableness in the Primary
and Secondary Classrooms, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 265, 276 (1997) (maintaining that imputing
any liability for a third-party’s sexual misconduct to an employer who creates a hostile
atmosphere constitutes an extremely expansive and inapt assignment of liability).
178. See, e.g., Little v. Windemere Relocation, 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002)
(denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because he reduced the claimant’s
salary and fired her after she reported rape by a customer, constituting a reaction that
arguably reinforced future harassment).
179. See LEE & LINDENHALL, supra note 175, at § 3.15 (positing that a higher degree of
care is expected from persons creating situations involving an unusually high risk of harm).
180. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551-52 (N.H. 1974)
(concluding that termination of an employment at will contract is not in the best interest of
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numerous state courts have found a common law breach for retaliatory
discharge by examining the public policy and economic efficiencies of
terminating employment based on an employee’s refusal to submit to other
employees’ sexual harassment.181 Courts aptly weigh employers’ interests
in running a business as they see fit against employees’ interest in justly
maintaining employment.182 More precisely, state courts recognize that
retaliatory firing for refusing third-party sexual advances simply is not
economically efficient nor sound public policy because highly qualified
employees are too often removed from the workplace for inefficient
reasons.183 Further, courts are cognizant of the manifest injustice of
employees succumbing to sexual aggression as a means of maintaining
employment benefits.184
The line of state cases permitting a common law breach of public policy
action against employers for co-employee sexual harassment should serve
as a model for jurisdictions seeking to extend similar tort liability to thirdparty sexual harassment claims, for such allegations carry similar public
policy and economic efficiency implications.185 After all, the public policy
and economic rationales for rejecting workplace gender disparity serve as
the thrust for the EEOC guidelines, as well as the development of sexual
harassment case law finding employer liability for third-party sexual
harassment in cases where the employer knew or should of have known of
the hostile work environment.186

the economic system or public good when termination is based on bad faith or malice in
retaliation for an employee’s refusal to submit to sexual harassment); see also Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983) (reasoning
that implied contractual protections are paternalistic, but that courts should apply such
protections in order to promote economic efficiency and distributive justice).
181. See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, 924 F.2d 530, 532-33 (4th Cir.
1991) (asserting that retaliatory discharge falls under the public policy exception to an atwill contract, for the employee’s rejection of the manager’s sexual advances amounted to a
refusal to engage in prostitution under North Carolina law).
182. See Monge, 316 A.2d at 551.
183. See Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, Introduction, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
279, 280 (1998).
184. See, e.g., Foster v. Albertsons, Inc., 835 P.2d 720, 723-24 (Mont. 1992) (asserting
that sexual harassment is a violation of public policy in light of Montana’s constitution,
which seeks to preserve human dignity and extend equal protection of the laws).
185. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); see also University of
Minnesota Aurora Center, Effects of Sexual Harassment, http://www1.umn.edu/aurora/
effectsofsexualharassment.pdf#search=‘economic%20effects%20of%20sexual%20harassme
nt’ (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (finding that sexual harassment reduces worker productivity,
increases absenteeism and benefits claims, creates job search expenses, and augments
turnover and employee replacement costs).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)1 (2006).
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B. State Courts Should Recognize Employees’ Common Law Contract
Causes of Action Against Employers for Third-Party Sexual Harassment
when Employers Engage in Bad Faith Conduct or Interfere with
Employees’ Freedom to Contract
1. State Courts Should Enforce Employees’ Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealings Against Employers
Although employees facing third-party sexual harassment may be in an
at-will employment agreement with their employers, state courts should
nonetheless enforce a common law action for breach of the covenant of
good faith when employers terminate an at-will employment for reasons,
such as resistance to third-party sexual harassment.187 Furthermore, courts
should infer an implied employment contract in cases where an employer
issues specific sexual harassment guidelines without clearly reserving the
right to terminate the employment at will.188 In these cases, employees
who remain with their employers for long periods can convincingly assert
that they were in a constructive contractual employment agreement and that
the employer’s failure to adhere to its own sexual harassment guidelines
constitutes a breach of an implied contractual agreement.189 Additionally,
courts can more readily ascertain the parties’ reasonable expectations and
their course of dealings during the employment relationship in order to
determine whether a termination, ostensibly for unsatisfactory
performance, actually involves employer bad faith.190
2. State Courts Should Recognize Employees’ Common Law Contract
Interference Claims Against Employers Who Encourage ThirdParty Sexual Harassment
State courts should allow employees to bring state common law claims
of contractual interference against employers who intentionally interfere
with their employees’ contractual performance by inducing or remaining
deliberately indifferent towards third-party sexual harassment.191 Although
187. See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH:
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 94 (1995) (recognizing that where state
law requires good faith termination, courts look to the normal course of events to determine
whether the reasons for termination were within the parties’ reasonable expectations).
188. See, e.g., Hew-Len v. F.W. Woolworth, 737 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (D. Haw. 1990).
189. See, e.g., Noye v. Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 15-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990) (Bilder, J., dictum) (noting that employees can recover for breach of contract
when employers fail to follow their articulated sexual harassment procedures).
190. See BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 187, at 94-95; see also Kree Inst. of
Electrolysis v. Fageros, 478 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (examining the
contractual employment relationship and course of dealings in deciding that the employer
terminated the employment relationship for bad faith reasons, even though the employer
alleged poor performance).
191. Cf. Newsome v. Cooper-Wiss, Inc., 347 S.E.2d. 619, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
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most jurisdictions require that an enforceable employment contract exist as
a precondition to applying the contractual interference doctrine, more state
courts should recognize that an employee in an at-will relationship can
assert a contractual interference claim against an employer who
intentionally creates or remains deliberately indifferent towards a hostile
work environment leading to third-party sexual harassment.192 This
particular course of action is logical because, in determining whether to
impute common law contractual interference liability to an employer,
courts also look to the employer’s conduct to discern if the employer acted
outside the scope of its authority.193
Clearly, an employer who
intentionally creates or deliberately tolerates a hostile work environment
that exposes its employees to third-party sexual harassment acts outside the
scope of his or her authority by intentionally endangering its employees’
health and welfare.194 Courts should not accept this behavior as part of an
employer’s power.195 Rather, courts should look to determine whether an
employer acted outside the scope of authority in determining contractual
interference applicability because it would be inequitable if an employer
can intentionally interfere with employees’ faithful execution of their duties
for personal pecuniary benefit.196
C. State Courts Should Award Employees Punitive Damages in
Particularly Reprehensible Third-Party Sexual Harassment Suits
State courts should impose punitive damages in addition to
compensatory damages against employers for the common law wrong of

(explaining that at-will employment relationships retain a contractual right, which may not
be unlawfully interfered with by a third person).
192. See, e.g., Cummings v. Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 833 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(rejecting that an employee, who was a laborer at a construction site alleging that she was
relegated to hard labor after rejecting a coworker’s sexual advances, could assert a
contractual interference claim because her employment was at-will and the employer fired
her because she refused to perform her new job duties). But see Fields v. Cummins
Employees Fed. Credit Union, 540 N.E.2d 631, 639-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (stressing that
at-will employees can assert a contractual interference claim when the hostile environment
compels employees to accept demotion).
193. See, e.g., Favors v. Alco Mfg. Co., 367 S.E.2d 328, 331-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
194. Cf. O’Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 351-52 (Mass. 1987) (observing that the
right to commit intentional torts was not part of workers’ compensation’s general
compromise because intentional torts are not a part of employment or necessary for
conducting business).
195. Cf. Jablonski v. Multack, 380 N.E.2d 924, 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (clarifying that
an employer cannot claim no-fault immunity for intentionally injurious conduct because
legislatures did not recognize employers’ intentional misconduct as a part of an employer’s
authority under Illinois’ workers’ compensation laws).
196. See Schoenheider, supra note 3, at 1480 (explaining that courts recognize an
interference with contractual relationship claim when there is an actual interference with an
employment relationship by someone with a malicious mind).
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subjecting their employees to third-party sexual harassment.197 Certainly,
the more reprehensible an employer’s conduct in acquiescing to or
facilitating the third-party sexual harassment, the larger the punitive
damages should be in proportion to the compensatory damages.198 In
accordance with the Court’s definition of reprehensibility, state courts
should find that employer conduct is extremely reprehensible and thus
justifies a significant punitive award when the employer deliberately
exposes his or her employees to third-party sexual harassment,199 or
engages in deceit and manipulation by wrongfully terminating an employee
resisting the third-party sexual harassment.200 Such egregious employer
conduct blatantly and recklessly jeopardizes the physical safety of the
employee, in addition to undermining the fundamental fairness of the
employment relationship. Therefore, state courts are correct to impose
substantial punitive awards, which also serve as exemplary damages201
intended to punish employers’ intentional conduct and deter similarly
reprehensible actions by other employers.202
CONCLUSION
The purpose of state workers’ compensation laws is to provide expedient
and equitable relief for employees who suffer primarily work-related
physical injuries, while shielding employers from fault.203 Unfortunately,
some employers continue to usurp exclusivity and no-fault provisions to
deny employees supplemental common law causes of action for third-party
sexual harassment wrongs.204 State courts need to confine workers’
197. See Madeja v. MPB Corp., 821 A.2d 1034, 1050-51 (N.H. 2003) (ruling that a
thirty-five to one punitive to compensatory ratio was appropriate against an employer for
sexual harassment because of the difficulty of measuring the damages to the victim’s
personal dignity and the employer showed reckless indifference to the employee’s rights not
to be sexually harassed or retaliated against).
198. See Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) (Kassal, J., concurring) (“As the trial court observed, ‘Sexual slavery was not a part
of plaintiff’s job description,’ despite the fact that her employment involved the commercial
exploitation of her physical appearance. . . . The sexual exploitation and harassment found
to have occurred by the trier of fact, which took the form of coercive sexual relationships
designed to further . . . financial interests, subjected plaintiff to levels of humiliation and
degradation that no civilized society should tolerate.”).
199. See, e.g., Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 2000).
200. See Rustad, supra note 36, at 37.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (explaining that punitive
damages serve as exemplary damages because they are intended to discourage the tortfeasor
and similarly situated individuals from similar future conduct).
202. See Van Horn v. Specialized Services, Inc. 241 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1013 (S.D. Iowa
2003).
203. See, e.g., Grammatico v. Indus. Comm’n, 90 P.3d 211, 218-19 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004).
204. See Harrison v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Dept., No. 00AP-240, 2000 WL
1808303, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2000) (emphasizing that claimants are denied all
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compensation statutes to their originally intended purposes in order to
provide employees cumulative remedies where the workers’ compensation
laws provide insufficient recovery or where the statutes are simply
inapplicable.205
Unless state courts reject the exclusivity doctrine for employees’ thirdparty sexual harassment suits, employers will retain an incentive to
prioritize monetary gain at the expense of employees’ health and safety.
Moreover, without cumulative remedies, claimants will continue to receive
inadequate compensation for third-party sexual harassment injuries when
their claims will not satisfy workers’ compensation laws’ requirements.206
On the other hand, a cumulative remedy approach will better comport with
Title VII’s gender equality purposes because it will appropriately impute
fault to employers who subject their employees to third-party sexual
harassment, while ensuring employees a full recovery for their physical,
mental, and economic losses.207

relief when workers’ compensation laws serve as the exclusive remedy for sexual
harassment injuries because employees with nonphysical injuries incur minimal economic
losses and are therefore ineligible for compensation).
205. See Brooke v. Rest. Servs. Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 68-70 (Colo. 1995).
206. See, e.g., Sisk v. Tar Heel Capital Corp., 603 S.E.2d 564, 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
207. See, e.g., Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla.
1989).
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